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Abstract. In the at February 8, 2013 by the European Council accepted budget 
for the European Union, the Union wants to introduce new own resources to 
finance the Union’s budget. The proposed European taxes are a Financial 
Transaction Tax (FTT) and an EU Value Added Tax (VAT). For the last, on 
every sales slip, the consumer can see that a part of the VAT he or she pays, 
goes directly to Brussels. The FTT is now approved by 11 of the 27 Member 
States; the VAT is still open for discussion (European Council, 2012). In this 
paper we look at this last new own resource and the Union’s decision-making 
process in view of the introduction of it. The question becomes why the 
existing VAT-based contribution of the Member States is unsatisfactory and 
why a direct contribution of the citizens to the Union would be an 
improvement.  
 After looking at the pros and cons of the new proposed EU tax, the 
regressivity of the VAT, the different levels of tax fraud in the Member States, 
and the EU decision-process itself do seem to stand out as the most 
fundamental obstacles to the introduction of the tax. The paper concludes with 
a sketch of a so-called declaratory EU VAT. In a declaratory tax, a country still 
pays its national, GNI-based contribution, but shows the contribution to the 
citizens as a percentage of the total VAT on every receipt.  
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Introduction 
 
In the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the European Union (EU 
or Union) for the upcoming seven year period, 2014-2020, the European 
Commission (Commission), the Union’s executive arm, wants to introduce two 
new own resources to finance the general EU budget (European Commission, 
2011a). The budget for the period is about 960 billion euro or one percent of 
the GNI of the EU Member States. The two proposed European taxes are a 
Financial Transaction Tax and an EU Value Added Tax. The Value Added Tax 
(VAT) is a general, broadly based consumption tax assessed on the value 
added to goods and services. It applies more or less to all goods and services 
that are bought and sold for use or consumption. For the first tax, the FTT 
carries a rate of 0.1% on trades in shares, bonds and other securities and 0.01% 
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on derivatives transactions. The FTT is now approved by 11 of the 27 Member 
States. For the second one, on every sales slip, the consumer can see that a part 
of the VAT paid, goes directly to Brussels. This last tax is still a work in 
progress and open for discussion (European Council, 2013).  
In the paper we look at the policy and decision-making process in view 
of the introduction of a EU VAT as a new own resource. The central question 
of the paper is why is the existing VAT-based contribution of the Member 
States to finance the EU budget unsatisfactory, and why is a direct contribution 
of the citizens to the Union, a EU VAT, an improvement.  
After the introduction, the paper starts with stating the role of the 
existing VAT-based contribution, in the past and present, as an own resource 
for the Union. Next the proposal of the Commission of a new VAT-based 
contribution is given. In the fourth part, we state the pros and cons of the 
proposal. In the final section we do answer our two main questions: (1) is the 
new VAT better than the old one, and (2) is the proposal viable in view of the 
decision-making process of the Union. The paper concludes with the option of 
a declaratory VAT. A declaratory EU VAT combines the strong points of the 
present GNI-based own resource with a EU VAT-based resource.  
 
 
The VAT: from 1970 till 2013 
 
In 1970 the EU made the milestone decision to replace national contributions 
with the Communities’ own resources. Though already in Article 201 of the 
Treaty of Rome (Treaty), signed in 1957, it was stated that a system of own 
resources, or self-financing, was to be introduced at the end of a transition 
period. During the first period direct Member States contributions did finance 
the Union.  Now, however, 75% of the EU budget is, again, financed by direct 
contributions, which also runs counter to the philosophy behind the Treaty. 
One of the new resources, introduced in the 70s of the last century, next to 
levies on agricultural and sugar trade with the rest of the world and custom 
duties on trade with third countries, were resources accruing from a proportion 
of national VAT revenues. They do derive from the application of a call rate to 
Member States’ VAT bases set according to harmonized rules. At the 
beginning, the tax was to be no more than 1 percent (European Communities, 
1970). 
 Though all three resources are called own resources, the first two 
resources mentioned are regarded as really or true own resources. They are 
called traditional own resources. They arise from Community policy 
instruments: the Common Agricultural Policy and the common commercial 
tariff. In general, they are not seen as a national contribution towards the 
Community budget. There was also from the beginning a distinct difference, 
though not in Community law, in the political perception at the national level 
between traditional own resources and the VAT based contribution. The VAT 
is generally perceived by governments and by national parliaments as a mere 
budgetary contribution (European Commission, 1998). The first two are, as 
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just-said, linked to EU policies while the VAT-based resource and the in 1988 
introduced fourth resource: a GNI-based own resource, are based on statistical 
aggregates. 
 In 1970, the levies on agricultural and sugar trade were transferred 
immediately to the EU, the customs duties on trade progressively between 
1970 and 1975. It took, however, until 1979 to get agreement on a harmonized 
VAT base.  
 Because successive trade negotiations reduced world tariffs, the 
traditional own resources declined as a proportion of total resources. The share 
of traditional own resources went from almost 50 percent of the budget in 1979 
to just 20 percent in 1993 and, now about 15 percent. The VAT furnished in its 
heyday in 1990, 70 percent of the EU budget, in 2005, 16 percent and now 
about 10 percent of the total EU budget.  
Until the introduction of the fourth resource: the GNI-based own 
resource in 1988, the VAT resource was the predominant resource. Because of 
growing expenses at the end of the seventies, the Commission identified a 
serious revenue problem. As a solution, next to some other taxes, e.g., part of 
the taxes on cigarettes and part of the taxes on petrol, a simple increase in the 
VAT rate was suggested. The result was that the VAT rate rose to 1.4 per cent 
at the Fontainebleau conference in 1984. Later the maximum VAT rate was 
maintained at 1.4 per cent but capped at 55 per cent of GNP for all Member 
States. When Jacques Delors was for the first time president of the 
Commission, 1988-1992, for the first time, a revenue limit was agreed for the 
whole EU budget: a ceiling of 1.2 per cent of the EU GNP.
1
 In 1996 the 
maximum VAT rate was reduced to 1 per cent and capped at 50 per cent for the 
cohesion states, which at that time were Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland 
(Laffan, 1997). At present the VAT call rate is 0.3 % (with, over the period 
2007-13, a reduced rate of 0.225 % for Austria, 0.15 % for Germany and 
0.10 % for the Netherlands and Sweden) and VAT bases are capped for all 
Member States at 50 % of GNI. In 2011 this resulted for, e.g., Greece in a 
payment of 278 million euro, for France about 3 billion, and for the Netherland 
290 million. Under the just-agreed new MFF a reduced VAT call rate of 0.15% 
(rather than 0.30%) will apply for Germany, The Netherlands and Sweden.  
 The reason not to rely any longer on a higher VAT rate was an attempt 
to deal with the regressive nature of the VAT resource; consumption and hence 
the VAT tends to form a higher proportion of the GNP of the poorer states of 
the community. Moreover, Member States with a higher share of tourism, the 
so-called Marbella effect, also show a higher consumption rate. VAT 
contributions, also, as an indication of wealth, inevitable overstate the ability of 
the poorer Member States to pay. The capping of the proportion of VAT for 
calculations on the uniform base represented a search for more equitable 
burden-sharing in the budget. In general, it was agreed by the European 
Council (1987), consisting of the heads of state or government and the 
President of the European Commission, that the financial system should take 
                                                 
1
 The GNI-based resource (the ‘residual’ resource) is determined so that total revenue balances 
total expenditure. 
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greater account of the proportionality of contributions in accordance with the 
relative prosperity of Member States. It was concluded by the Commission that 
less prosperous states, the just-mentioned cohesion states, all had relatively 
high VAT bases and thus were disadvantaged under the 1988 system, even 
with capping. Especially since, at that time because of economic growth, the 
new introduced fourth resource, a topping up of the budget based on the GNI 
of the Member States was not that effective.  
In sum, the problem remained of how to tackle the regressive nature of 
the existing VAT contribution. This because it, as just said, gave advantages to 
Member States with a low VAT base and penalized those, generally the poorer 
states, with a high VAT base. In general the Commission (1998) and the 
Member States declared their willingness to take greater account of the 
contributive capacity of individual Member States in the system of own 
resources (European Commission, 1998).  
 
The VAT and the United Kingdom rebate 
  
But the VAT rate also played another role from the point of ability to pay: the 
UK problem. Already before the accession it was known the UK would pay a 
disproportionate amount into the Community budget. The reason was its 
structure of trade and particularly the high level of imports form non-
Community states. On the expenditure site, the UK was unlikely to benefit 
greatly form the Common Agricultural Policy. Also, next to the cohesion 
countries, the UK too paid a disproportionate contribution based on relative 
wealth to the budget. It was agreed that an equitable solutions was needed. The 
resulting structural UK budgetary rebate, after some ad hoc solutions before, 
took form in a reduction of the VAT contribution. The refund to the UK is 66 
percent of the difference between the receipts from the Union and the VAT 
contribution (European Council, 2007). But here too we do see the special 
position of the traditional own resources, which should not be calculated as a 
part of a net contribution. Mutatis mutandis other Member States saw their 
juste-retour problems repaired by a correction on their VAT contributions. 
Another important reason for the Union to introduce an EU tax is to counter the, 
just-mentioned, juste-retour behavior of the Member States. States favor 
expenditures that improve their net national benefits and contributions to the 
Union, rather than those with the greatest value added for the EU as a whole. 
Such purely self-interested behavior has been shown to be the result of the 
dominant way for financing the EU – with national, GNI-based contributions. 
This method of financing ‘places disproportionate emphasis on net balances 
between Member States [,] thus contradicting the principle of EU solidarity, 
diluting the European common interest and largely ignoring European added 
value’ (European Commission, 2011c).  
In sum, the problem of regressiveness and the way it is solved, by 
capping the VAT base, has put the VAT in its distributional effects similar to 
the GNI resource (Heinemann, 2008). The disadvantages, however, compared 
to a purely GNI-based resource are severe. First, the present VAT own 
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resource creates high administrative cost as the harmonized based must be 
calculated for this purpose (European Commission, 2008). Second, it is, 
because of all the exceptions granted to individual Member States, 
unnecessarily complex and difficult to understand for the citizens. The VAT 
contribution has become a contribution based on GNP. As the Court of 
Auditors says, ‘the VAT resource is levied on a “virtual” basis (harmonized 
VAT base which may be subsequently capped and takes into account 
compensation arrangements for UK) which is complex to the point of 
incomprehensibility,’ (European Commission 2011b).2 All in all, the result is 
that the Commission’s priority is to get rid of the existing VAT own resource.  
  
 
 
An EU VAT  
 
The existing VAT, based on a share of national VAT receipts, is, as just-said, 
complex, requires much administrative work to arrive at a harmonized base, 
and offers little or no added value compared to the GNI-based own resource 
(European Commission, 2011b). In search of new own resources the 
introduction of a new EU VAT is an option favored by the Commission and the 
European Parliament. The goal of the Commission is to make the VAT-based 
contribution as simple and transparent as possible, to strengthen the link with 
EU VAT policy and the actual VAT-receipts, and to ensure equal treatment of 
taxpayers in all Member States. What does the new VAT look like?  
The Commission proposes to apply a single EU VAT rate. National 
authorities would still raise the money and then transfer the money to the EU 
budget. The option of a new VAT resource alongside Member States’ VAT 
poses serious technical implementation problems and has therefore been 
discarded (European Commission, 2011b). A genuine EU-wide tax base would 
replace the complex formula currently required to generate a theoretical EU 
VAT tax base. The Commission estimates a 1% EU rate applied to the standard 
rate of VAT in every Member State leads to revenue between 20.9 and 50.4 
billion euro. This depending on how narrow/wide the chosen tax base is 
(European Commission, 2011b). At the moment, however, the main stumbling 
block to an EU VAT is the incomplete harmonization of Member States’ VAT 
systems. Hence, the policy could be a part of the wider EU policy on 
overhauling the existing VAT legislation. The aim of that policy is to come to 
greater standardization of rates and fewer reduced rates across EU Member 
States to increase the strength of the internal market (European Commission, 
2010). 
 In sum, the introduction of an EU VAT means that the combined VAT 
rate in the Member States consists of the national and the EU rate. Member 
States still determine the national rate and the EU rate is defined separately in 
                                                 
2
 See for the incomprehensible correction for budgetary imbalances Art.1 European 
Commission, 2004/017 (CNS), Brussels 3.8.2004, p. 25. Cp. European Commission (2008), p. 
234-244. 
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the framework of the own resource decision. Next to the national VAT 
payment, the EU VAT payments are clearly denoted on each individual invoice. 
The Member States collect the EU VAT and transfer the proceeds to the EU 
budget; it is a revenue transfer mechanism and not a parallel system to that of 
the Member States. The tax base corresponds to the smallest common 
denominator of national VAT systems. This means that a good subject to 
national VAT at the standard rate in a Member State is subject to the new VAT 
resource rate unless the same good is subject to a reduced rate or an exemption 
in another Member State (European Commission, 2011b).  
  
 
The pros and cons of a new EU VAT  
 
The Pros 
 
On the positive site, there are some clear benefits. A first benefit of the 
Commission’s proposal is its visibility and simplicity for EU citizens. On every 
sale’s slip the consumer can see how much of the money paid goes to the 
Union and hence how much he or she pays to the budget of the Union. It could 
also fulfill the wish of the European Parliament and Commission to create a 
better bond between the EU citizens/corporations and the Union. The reason is 
that the Union has evolved from a bond between Member States to a bond 
between Member States and its citizens. If, as is proposed, for the citizens of 
the Union, the total taxation burden---indeed---stays the same after the 
introduction of the EU VAT, it can easily be introduced for the goods 
concerned. Of the present national rate, the EU rate of 1 % just has to be 
deducted.  
Second, it is said that with a new true own resource, the financial 
autonomy of the Union would grow. Juste-retour behavior of the Member 
States would be less pronounced and hence there would be a more efficient 
allocation of EU economic resources. At the same time, because of higher 
visibility for EU citizens, there could be an increased political accountability 
for expenditure decisions.  
Third, and related to the previous point, it brings into perspective for 
the citizens the size of the EU budget. At present the budget is about 130 
billion euro. A 1% sales tax, as the Commission expects, could furnish about a 
third of the EU budget. The contribution of, e.g., Greece would be 1.1 billion 
euro, France 8.2 billion euro, and The Netherlands, 2.2 billion euro.  
Fourth, another benefit of the EU VAT is, next to the fact that the VAT 
is a stable source of revenue, that tax receipts grow in line with increased 
spending without any change in the VAT rate. In this respect the VAT 
resembles the strong points of the present GNI contribution.  
 Fifth, the development of a common VAT system has been a 
cornerstone of the Internal Market. The existing complexity is considered 
harmful to the single market and to the competiveness of EU business. The 
introduction of a new own resource could be underpinned by this trend of 
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broadening the tax base, reducing the scope for fraud, improving the 
administration of the tax and reducing compliance costs. At present, in 
particular for cross-border supplies the VAT system remains complicated and 
burdensome. For the Commission (2011b), a fraction of the gains derived from 
this reform could be attributed to the EU level. 
 Six, the system would closely link national policies for VAT with EU 
budget policies: a shift towards indirect rather than direct taxation.     
Seven, if it are individual citizens that pay directly to the Union, the 
often cited Marbella effect would not be relevant anymore. As said, the effect 
places a relatively higher burden on the Mediterranean countries with their 
higher share of tourism. In the old to be discarded VAT it were national 
contributions, in the new VAT, however, it are individuals: tourists or locals, 
who do pay. 
 
The Cons 
 
On the negative side, some serious problems exist. First, probably only lip-
service will be paid to earlier statements that the tax burden for citizens stays 
the same with the introduction of an EU tax (European Parliament, 2007). 
Probably, the total rate for the consumers will rise. Because of the high 
visibility, it could also be a problem if the citizens perceived the EU VAT as an 
additional burden rather than replacing a national contribution. Are not, as is 
said, at least halve of all revolutions in the world tax revolutions. The aim of 
the Union to get a direct bond with EU citizens could turn into the opposite. 
The Commission does not mention public support for an EU VAT, as it does 
mention a 65% support of European citizens for the FTT. A tax designed to 
discourage what it considers socially useless trading activities and let the banks 
pay for the crisis. And though consumers with an FTT can be fooled in 
thinking someone else does pay (Worstall, 2012) with an EU VAT this will not 
be the case. Compared to the FTT, if the total VAT cannot be raised, probably 
the measure will not be attractive for National Governments. An FTT does not 
only leave present tax receipt for Member States the same but it even adds 
revenue to the Member States. 
 Second, a genuine EU-wide VAT tax base would remove the possibility 
of Member States tailoring VAT rates to changing economic circumstances and 
to redress the regressive nature of the tax (Open Europe, 2011). In history, the 
regressive nature has always been taken seriously and can even be seen as the 
reason the present EU VAT contribution is no more than a GNI based 
contribution.
3
 In the past, the European Parliament (1994) already wanted to 
impose different rates on different categories of goods to mitigate the 
regressive effect of the tax. For the same reason the European Commission, 
(2011b) also looked at the option of a modulated VAT which would allow for 
different EU rates to be applied to different categories of goods. 
                                                 
3
 Recently, however, the Commission (2011b, p. 107) did found a slightly negative---but not 
statistically significant---relationship between the potential revenues form the hypothetical new 
VAT resource and the GNI per capita of the Member States.  
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 Third, as far as the actual introduction of an EU VAT goes, since the 
Member States did recently increase the existing VAT rates, the room to 
increase it any further in the near future is small. So an EU VAT will not solve 
the problem that the EU heavily rests on GNI-based resources.  
Fourth, as of any change in the own resource system there will be 
distributive consequences. Based on calculations made by Heinemann (2008), 
the introduction of an EU VAT would cause major distributive consequences. 
Cyprus, e.g., would have to pay almost 70% more than under GNI 
proportionality, which is in fact the present VAT contribution. Denmark, on the 
other hand, would have to pay almost 20% less. Again, the reason is the 
regressive character of VAT which burdens the poorer Southern and Eastern 
Member States relatively more due to a higher consumption ratio. In short, in 
the decision-process, the old juste-retour hurdle has to be taken again.  
Fifth, the regressive character of VAT contributions is not tackled. As 
far as the regressive character goes the switch from the burden in terms of 
national GNI to per capita consumption is non-essential. 
 Six, the decision-making process for a Treaty change in the own 
resource system is one of the most difficult of the Union. The proposal of the 
European Commission, after having consulted the European Parliament, must 
be adopted unanimously by the Council and the national parliaments of the 27 
Member States. At the moment, for the European Parliament a reform of the 
own resources towards genuine own resources is a not negotiable point for 
giving its consent to the MFF. This process is at present still undecided.  
 Seven, because of national differences regarding tax fraud and 
administrative efficiency the postulate of horizontal equity is violated. In the 
1990s, the rate of VAT evasion and fraud ranged from 2.4 percent in the 
Netherlands to 34.5 percent in Italy (Heinemann, 2008). 
 
   
Conclusion and the option of a declaratory EU VAT  
 
Given and affirming the pros, what cons do stand out as overriding the pros?  
Three problems seem to stand out most significantly in view of the introduction 
of a reformed EU VAT: the regressivity of the VAT, tax fraud, and the 
decision-making process. If, indeed, the total national VAT stays the same, 
regressivity, cannot be a problem. The status quo stays the same: for the 
consumer nothing does change. Though probably the total VAT rate will 
increase and regressivity will be on the fore front. The problem of tax fraud 
will not be that easy to overcome. This notwithstanding the Union’s policy to 
get a better overall VAT. The policy will probably mostly reduce cross-border 
VAT fraud. In the short run, the official process of decision-making looks to be 
the most compelling obstacle. Since national contributions do change, the 
juste-retour behavior of the Member States will be pervasive. 
Is there a compelling reason for introducing a new EU VAT? This since 
the present GNI-based own resource has some strong points and receives 
support from the Member States. Besides that, juste-retour behavior is natural 
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and hard to fight.
4
 National payments of the GNI resource are easy to calculate, 
understood by the citizens, and are seen as a good indicator for the national 
capability to pay. In short, the system is seen as a simple and fair way of 
financing. Though some countries, because of tax fraud, do underestimate their 
GNI. In sum, the GNI contribution is not much different from what the 
European Parliament wants to achieve with an EU. Save no direct relation 
exists with the EU citizens and, the financial autonomy for the European Union 
would not be changed.  
Probably, however, with the new EU VAT, just as before, the Member 
States will still make the net contributor, net beneficiary balances. Besides, the 
goal of getting autonomy is, or ought to be, no goal for the Union. Though, of 
course, financial autonomy is something every bureaucracy wants (Alves & 
Afonso, 2008). Therefore, it can never be a goal per se. It can only be a goal 
because of some other goal that otherwise cannot be attained. For the Union 
this is clearly the goal of securing expenses with an added value for Europe as 
a whole. Though for the same reason, on the opposite, an EU tax may lead to 
less budgetary discipline on the European level. 
The problem of autonomy is closely related to the fact that Member 
States interpret an EU tax as a loss of their fiscal sovereignty. Hence, the 
European Parliament (2007) emphasizes, ‘fiscal sovereignty will be maintained, 
but only temporary the receipts of certain taxes will go directly to the EU’. 
From an economic point, however, the eternal socialization of an asset’s return 
is the same of the socialization of the asset itself (Sinn & Feist, 2000). Mutatis 
mutandis, this goes too for the temporary pooling of the revenue of taxation.  
 
A declaratory EU VAT 
 
Is there another way to introduce an EU VAT without the just-mentioned 
difficulties? An EU Vat can also be introduced as a so-called declaratory tax. 
In a declaratory tax, a country still pays its national, GNI-based contribution to 
the EU, but shows its contribution to its citizens as a percentage of, e.g., the 
VAT on every receipt (Caesar, 2001). The amount is pro forma linked to a 
certain tax; a country can choose its own ‘EU’ tax. Since the preferred method 
of taxation differs between Member States, this is an advantage. Harmonization 
of tax bases between countries is not necessary. Another advantage is that no 
additional collection costs have to be made. The quality of the national tax 
authorities does not matter either, as it would be of importance, because of tax 
fraud, with a true new EU VAT. Because, at present, not every country collects 
the tax revenues it should in view of the existing tax-rate. With the new EU tax 
there would be no horizontal equity between the citizens of the Member States. 
Greece, for example, collected, with consumption amounting to two thirds of 
the GNI, about the same amount of VAT as the Netherlands: about 8 percent of 
GNI. In the Netherlands, however, consumption is something less then halve of 
GNI (Gros, 2008).  
                                                 
4
 See Leen, A.R. (2011), ‘What an EU Tax Means', EC Tax Review, 20 (4): 203-205. 
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Some disadvantages do exist. Because the VAT rates will differ in the 
Member States, no horizontal equity exists among the citizens in the Member 
States. But the main argument against it is that the public, in a sense, is misled. 
The Union still receives direct contributions from the Member States; the 
autonomy of the EU seems larger than it is. 
In sum, the VAT as a declaratory EU tax combines the strong points of 
the GNI contribution with the visibility of a EU VAT.  
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